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THE DETERMINANTS OF LONG-RUN GROWTH:  
WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED  






The economics of long-run growth probably has been one of the most 
lively areas of economic research. Although interest in the analysis of 
long-run growth has never been lost, its revival may be observed since 
the mid-1980s. The following advancements in both theoretical and 
empirical research have contributed to a better understanding of the 
complex growth process, but a comprehensive answer to the question 
of what determines growth is, however, still to be reached. 
 
Section 2 briefly reviews the existing growth theories and serves as an 
introduction to the overview of empirical tests that have been made to 
reexamine the determinants of long-run growth and to explore whether 
there is anything automatic about the growth of an economy. After an 
empirical exercise that closes the discussion in Section 3, Section 4 
focuses on the case of Croatia, questions the applicability of cross-
country regression analysis to the case of a specific economy and drives 
future-oriented policy implications as well as some insights on the 
Croatia's growth prospects. It is followed by concluding remarks in 
Section 5. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Classical economists used to approach the issue of economic growth by 
exploring the relationship among income distribution, capital 
accumulation, and growth.1 Following that line, the growth theorists Sir 
Roy Harrod and Evsey Domar built models that reflected their belief 
                                                          
1 See Ramsey (7928). 
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that market forces were not sufficient to assure equilibrium growth with 
full employment, and they determined conditions under which there 
would exist an equilibrium path of growth. 
 
Developed by Solow (1956) and others,2 the neoclassical growth model, 
which is usually regarded as the origin of modern growth theory, placed 
its emphasis on the ease of substitution between capital and labor in 
the underlying production process. Substitutability ensured steady-state 
growth and avoided the problem of instability present in the Harrod-
Domar model as a result of the assumed fixed capital-labor ratio. Main 
implications of the Solow's 1956 model are comprised in its 
fundamental equation of capital accumulation, where k represents  per 
 
                                                          
2 Significant contributions were made by Swan (1956), Koopmans (1965), and Cass 
(1965). 
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capita capital, s saving rate, y per capita output, n exogenously 
determined rate of population growth, and a depreciation rate of 
physical capital.3 Equation indicates that the growth of capital, in per 
capita terms, is equal to the rate of per capita saving (sy) less the 
amount needed to equip the new entrants in the labor force (nk) and to 
replace the depreciating capital (δk). Consequently, the long-run 
equilibrium is reached when capital-labor ratio reaches position (point E 
in Figure 1) in which per capita saving becomes just equal to the 
amount of saving needed to equip the new entrants to the labor force 
and to replace the depreciating capital. Whenever the economy is away 
from its steady-state, with either too much or too little capital per 
capita there are forces that push it back to the long-term steady-state 
equilibrium. Namely, as per capita capital increases (decreases), 
marginal productivity of capital declines (increases) due to diminishing 
returns to factor inputs and capital-labor ratio approaches constant. 
 
In the absence of technological progress, the levels of output, capital 
stock and labor force are increasing at the exogenously determined rate 
n in the steady-state, while there is no change in the per capita terms. 
If, however, the technological progress is present, neoclassical model 
predicts that output and capital stock will grow in per capita terms at 
the exogenously determined rate of technological progress. 
 
Increasing savings and investment does not lead to a permanent 
increase in the growth rate of either the capital stock or output. As per 
capita stock grows, the return to capital falls and because of the 
constant investment share, the amount of new investment per capita 
increases at a diminishing rate. The dashed curve (sy)' in Figure 1 
shows effect of the higher saving rate, while the dashed line (n+δ)k' 
shows the impact of the lower rate of population growth rate in the 
steady-state. In either of these two cases the levels of per capita 
output and capital stock are improved in the long-run equilibrium 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Sachs and Larrain (1993) for the complete description of the 
basic neoclassical model 
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position, but the change of parameters has no effect on the long-run 
growth rate. 
 
For our further analysis it is important to notice that in the absence of 
technological progress (or if technology is effectively available 
everywhere) traditional neoclassical model predicts convergence in 
growth rates of per capita output across countries no matter what the 
initial endowments of an economy are. Within this framework, then, the 
differences in per capita growth rates can be explained only by the 
transitional dynamics, namely, either by the fact that countries that 
started from different initial conditions grow at different rates in the 
process of approaching the same long-run equilibrium, or by different 
underlying parameters that specify various economies (like social 
institutions and preferences about investment), so that economies are 
actually moving along different paths towards different equilibrium 
positions. 
 
Being one of the main contributions to the theory of economic growth 
Solow's model is still, to the great extent, regarded as relevant. 
However, the time that has passed since its development, intensive 
work in the field of economic growth, improvements in the model 
building, and new data sets that can more precisely capture the growth 
experiences across a variety of countries have resulted in a number of 
new theories that are today often referred to as the "new growth 
theories." 
 
This recent work distinguishes itself from the neoclassical framework by 
emphasizing that economic growth is an endogenous outcome of 
economic system and not the forces that are operating outside the 
system. The researchers of the late 1980s and early 1990s have felt 
uncomfortable with the fact that in the prevailing growth model long-
term growth is actually determined by exogenous technological 
progress. In addition, the neoclassical theory has not offered adequate 
policy advice for the continuing problems of the real world such as the 
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slower growth of high-income countries and persistent non-increasing 
growth of the low-income ones.4 Much of the new growth literature 
emphasizes, therefore, that distortions and policy interventions that 
affect the level of output in the traditional model, can also affect the 
steady-state growth rate. 
 
In spite of the extensive work on endogenous growth that is still 
underway, there are several groups of models that may be identified. 
Following the work of Arrow and others5 in the 1960s, in the first 
approach that is usually attributed to Romer (1986), Lucas (1988, 
1993) and Scott (1991), new investments in capital lead to 
technological progress in the form of "learning-by-doing" with constant 
returns to scale on the level of a single firm but increasing returns to 
scale at the aggregate level, thus retaining the assumption of perfect 
competition and avoiding the explicit recognition of monopoly power. 
Beneficial external effects of capital, that includes both physical and 
human, outweigh the harmful consequences of increasing capital per 
worker and assure that marginal productivity of capital does not 
decline. Consequently, rich countries may grow forever, while poor may 
stay poor. Due to human capital, the increasing returns to scale as well 
as the possibility of an infinite growth of economies are set into the 
model. When individuals or firms accumulate new capital, they 
unintentionally contribute to the productivity of capital held by others. 
 
The second area of endogenous growth analysis has devoted more 
attention to research and development (R&D). In these models there is 
some kind of spillover, externality or public good. Private returns might 
be diminishing but due to externalities, social returns are not 
                                                          
4 Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) cited the observed failure of cross-country 
convergence as a motivation to build models of growth with technological change 
being neither exogenous nor instantly available in all countries of the world. In 
addition, new growth theories were motivated by struggle to construct a viable 
alternative to perfect competition aggregate-level theory since the neoclassical 
model has not captured the fact that many individuals and firms have market power 
and earn monopoly rents due to achieved technological advances (Romer, 1994). 
5 See Arrow (1969, 1973), and Nelson and Phelps (1966). 
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decreasing, and the competitive equilibrium is sub-optimal. Following 
Uzawa (1965) and others, this class of model was developed by Romer 
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). 
The models with monopoly power essentially assume the existence of a 
separate technology sector in the economy that supplies the other 
sectors with new technologies. Producers buy the new technology and 
charge a price above the marginal cost of their production to generate 
enough income to cover the costs that include the initial investment in 
new technologies. Innovation raises the productivity of all subsequent 
innovation projects and the productivity of new investments in 
innovative activity does not have decreasing productivity allowing the 
growth to go on.6 
 
Growth can be understood through another line of new growth theories 
to result purely from the accumulation of capital, if capital is interpreted 
as a broad measure of all relevant types including human and 
nonhuman (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, 1990; Jones and Manuelli, 
1990; King and Rebelo, 1990; Rebelo, 1991). In these models growth is 
endogenous despite absence of increasing returns.  
 
Capital is the driving force behind the economic growth, and firms 
continually add to their stocks of capital in the perfectly competitive 
markets with constant returns to scale. In this linear model of 
endogenous growth, perfect competition requires that capital is paid its 
marginal product, which must be above the discount rate for 
investment to remain profitable. The authors posit a lower bound on 
the private return to capital as a property of the aggregate production 
function to assure that investment continues to be profitable. 
 
All models of endogenous growth must break the constraint of 
diminishing returns to accumulation imposed in the basic Solow model. 
Main implication is that economies that save and invest more will 
                                                          
6 See Helpman (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1994) for an overview of 
models with innovation-based growth. 
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generally grow faster in the long-run and, therefore, the policies that 
affect saving rate will have more significant impact on the economic 
welfare. Consequently, economies do not necessarily reach the steady-
state growth rate just equal to the rate of population growth and 
technological progress. Growth at higher level than this can be self-
sustaining, since diminishing returns to capital do not set in. Increasing 
saving rate may result in a permanent increase in growth and countries 
do not necessarily converge. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The slowdown of growth that was observed worldwide in the first half 
of 1970s persisted throughout 1980s with only marginal improvements 
in the standards of living in the industrial countries and almost no 
improvements among a huge number of poorest countries. This 
experience, although punctuated by some miraculous growth 
performances that occurred, renewed interest among economists in 
empirical analysis aimed at determining the factors affecting growth. 
Important additional incentives have come both from the new growth 
theories and from improved cross-country data sets that have allowed 
extensive empirical and, in particular, econometric work. 
 
Most often these recent empirical analysis have focused on the 
hypothesis which claims that economies that start out behind tend to 
grow faster in per capita terms and converge toward those that began 
ahead. The evidence on the presence or absence of the convergence 
pattern is often illustrated by the statistical significance of the inverse 
association between the initial position of an economy and its 
subsequent growth rate as shown in Figure 2. 
 
The first chart of Figure 2. covers a broad and heterogenous set of 119 
countries including most of the industrial and developing countries 
except for the ex-centrally-planned ones for which the data was not 
available.  In  this  case the initial levels are essentially uncorrelated (or  
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even slightly positively correlated) with the subsequent average growth 
rates, indicating the absence of convergence. The second two charts 
deal with DECD and EU economies as more homogeneous sets of 
countries that have similar underlying structures. It is clear that in 
these two cases those economies that had started behind, have 
experienced more rapid growth over the 1960-88 period.7 
 
As follows from the previous section, the standard theoretical 
framework for studying convergence hypothesis is the neoclassical 
growth model that implies the presence of convergence on the basis of 
diminishing returns to capital. However, since different economies are 
essentially defined by different underlying parameters, countries may 
be heading towards different long-run steady-states which, according to 
the supporters of traditional growth theory, explains the observed 
nonconvergence pattern in the real world. Factors like existing 
institutional framework, protection of property rights or education in 
addition to those that are not directly influenced by governments such 
as attitudes toward saving, fertility rates or availability of natural 
resources, determine whether economies would or would not converge 
at all. In the case of heterogenous groups of countries with different 
underlying parameters, standard neoclassical model recognizes the 
conditional form of convergence according to which an economy grows 
faster if its initial level of per capita income is further away from its 
long-run target. If, however, the underlying parameters, such as 
preferences, technology and government policies, are the same across 
countries or regions of countries, the traditional model predicts the 
absolute form of convergence implying that poorer countries would 
grow faster in per capita terms than the richer ones (Barro, 1994). 
 
A substantial part of the contemporary empirical literature that studies 
why different economies experience sharp divergences in the longterm 
                                                          
7 Statistically significant inverse association hetween initial level of income and 
subsequent growth has also been confirmed across U. S. states, different regions of 
European countries and provinces of Japan (Barro, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1990, 1991). 
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growth rates, regresses the average GDP growth rates on the initial 
income levels and various explanatory variables. These empirical tests 
usually attempt to isolate observable variables that serve as proxies for 
the long-run income target and test the inverse relationship between a 
country's starting position and its subsequent growth rate. The 
variables that are most often held constant are measures of human 
capital and economic openness, the shares of investment and 
government consumption in GDP, as well as different indicators of 
socio-political stability. 
 
These empirical tests are often also viewed as a means of testing the 
validity of the two competing theoretical views of growth, the 
traditional one and new one. Baumol (1986), Dowrick and Nguyen 
(1989), Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) have argued that the observed tendency for 
initial income to be robustly negatively related with subsequent growth 
in cross-country regression analysis, after controlling for potential 
differences, could be interpreted as evidence in favor of the 
neoclassical model with diminishing returns to capital accumulation. In 
order to justify the pure version of the neoclassical model, capital only 
needs to include both physical and human capital, so that the 
diminishing returns set in very slowly. Although there exists a growing 
number of empirical studies, some of which support Solow's theory and 
others which support the new growth theories, Helpman (1992) 
concludes that at this stage the data do not distinguish sharply enough 
between these alternatives. This situations has partly to do with the 
fact that the neoclassical theory and the new growth theories are more 
complements than substitutes and partly with the fact that existing 
tests are not powerful enough. As opposed to the empirical work of 
1960s and 1970s which involved primarily the analysis of factor sources 
of growth, this type of framework is focused on policy sources of 
growth and should be viewed more as a reconciliation of the traditional 
and new growth theories since the components of both models can be 
recognized in empirical studies. 
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Table 1 gives an overview of recent studies and their results.8 A quick 
glance at the table confirms that authors study different sets of 
countries over different time periods using thereby rather different 
explanatory variables. The great diversity of these studies makes it 
difficult both to discover consistent relationships and to compare the 
results. However, the most important lessons from the existing 
empirical literature refer to the general support for the models where a 
catch-up variable is combined with additional explanatory variables 
reflecting efforts to close the existing gap between the current and 
long-term equilibrium position of an economy. The two most often used 
explanatory variables are investment in physical capital and investment 
in human capital. It is, however, hard to distinguish between them, 
since the importance of education usually diminishes when included 
with physical capital investment. Similar situation occurs with the 
economic openness: it is usually not significant but probably works 
through other variables. 
 
On the basis of cross-country regressions it can be said that rapid 
growth is associated with high saving and investment, well educated 
work forces and the ability to capture the technology of leading 
countries. Export orientation, low government spending, absence of 
price distortions and stable socio-political system are also linked with 
good growth performances. The results suggest that potential for 
catch-up exists, but it can only be realized by countries that have a 
sufficiently strong social capability, that manage to mobilize the 
necessary resources, and that have a stable macroeconomic 
environment. In the process of economic growth most of these factors 
are not substitutes but complements.9 
                                                          
8 The collection of studies is by no means complete. It has been selected on the 
largely arbitrary basis, with the main objective to review the most recent empirical 
studies. An extended review of studies undertaken in the second half of 1980s may 
be found in Levine and Renelt (1991) and in Fagerberg (1994). 






After reviewing a portion of the empirical literature on economic growth 
that include cross-country regression analysis, one is tempted to agree 
with Fagerberg (1994), who argues that we face nowadays sharply 
diminishing returns to this type of analysis. However, it should be 
stressed that in each specific study researchers have considered only a 
small number of explanatory variables in the attempt to establish a 
statistically significant relationships between growth and policy 
indicators of their particular interest. Some researchers have, for 
instance, tried to tide trade and growth but, at the same time, have 
completely ignored the role of fiscal or monetary policy, or just the 
opposite.10 In that respect is the exercise that follows different since, 
besides checking for the convergence, it attempts to simultaneously 
employ a comprehensive set of different policy variables. 
 
Exercise is based on Barro-Sala-i-Martin's (1990, 1991, 1992) 
framework for measuring convergence effect, which was developed 
within the neoclassical growth model for closed economies with 
diminishing returns to capital. According to this methodology per capita 
growth of real GDP is related to the initial level of GDP as well as initial 
level of human capital stock and a number of ancillary variables, such 
as proxies for macroeconomic policies and sociopolitical stability. 
 
Explanatory variables that are employed in each of the six equations 
presented in Table 2 are initial level of GDP and human capital stock as 
well as investment share of physical capital to GDP. However, in some 
of the equations these variables are replaced by more narrowly defined 
measures and combined with a number of other indicators of 
macroeconomic policies and socio-political stability. 
 
                                                          
10 Fischer's (1993) study, in which author combines different indicators of 
macroeconomic policy, is one of a few exceptions. 
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The regression coefficient with the initial level of GDP is negative and 
highly significant in each of the six equations. This negative effect of 
the initial per capita income on output growth relates to the 
convergence hypothesis implying that countries with output per capita 
lower than their long-run target values are expected to grow faster 
conditioned on variables that are held constant. It should be stressed 
that this finding of convergence does not mean that typically poor 
countries tend to catch up to the rich ones. The essence of the 
conditional convergence is that the poor countries also have low long-
run target values of per capita incomes. Therefore, absolute 
convergence concept would apply only if the determinants of their 
target positions, which are essentially dependent on the national 
government policies, would improve. 
 
Since recent growth theories have emphasized the importance of 
human capital for the diffusion of technology a positive sign is expected 
with its initial level. It is also important to notice that the proxy for 
human capital stock (average number of years of total schooling in 
1960) comes from the Barro and Lee (1993b) data set on international 
educational attainment. The literacy rate and school enrollment ratios 
that were frequently used elsewhere as proxies for human capital 
accumulation measure either only one component of human capital or 
the current flow of education that creates the future human capital 
stock. The lag between flow and stock is long, and consequently even if 
it is taken into account in a regression, it is doubtful how to evaluate 
the initial stock of human capital. Likewise, it is doubtful how to 
correctly resolve the issues of mortality and migration. These estimates, 
therefore, have not accurately measured the stock of human capital 
available for current production. In that respect the Barro-Lee data set 
is a significant improvement although the data still miss adjustment for 
the quality of education.11 
                                                          
11 Benhahib and Spiegel (1994) as well as Barro (1994) have shown that the proxy 
for the stock of human capital performs much better in cross-country regressions 
than previously used proxies such as the literacy rate and the primary and 
secondary school enrollment rates. 
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The first equation, besides the initial level of GDP and human capital 
stock, includes as explanatory variables the share of investment in GDP 
and the average rate of population growth. The investment share of 
physical capital to GDP captures the positive effect of capital formation 
on income according to standard growth theory. Namely, in the 
traditional Solow model, both the investment share and population 
growth are exogenously determined and have no impact on the longrun 
per capita growth rates, but do affect the level of long-run per capita 
income which is improved by an increase in the investment ratio and 
diminished by the higher rate of population growth. Both coefficients 
are of the expected sign. 
 
Second equation is expanded by indicators of government, trade, and 
monetary policy. The expected negative effect of government spending, 
explained by the fact that higher taxes necessary to finance increased 
government expenditures would distort economic incentives (and 
efficiency, is highly significant. So is the coefficient with inflation rate. 
The regression coefficient with the proxy for trade policy is of the 
expected sign, but insignificant either because of the imperfections in 
proxy used or because it is correlated with some other variables. 
 
In Equations 3 through 6, the share of total physical investment to GDP 
is replaced by the share of equipment and nonequipment investment. 
Equipment investment proves to be highly significant and strongly 
improves the overall characteristics of the estimated equation, while the 
coefficient for the nonequipment share is plainly insignificant. 
 
In Equation 4 the initial stock of total human capital is replaced by the 
more narrowly defined stocks of both male and female human capital. 




Equation 5 introduces the black market exchange rate premium as a 
general proxy for distortionary policies and overall macroeconomic 
instability. Obviously, the distortions impair economic growth. 
 
Finally, in Equation 6, measures of socio-political instability and 
conditions in Latin American countries are added to equation.12 They 
join the initial level of GDP, the total human capital stock, the shares of 
equipment and nonequipment investment, the share of government 
consumption, and the black market exchange rate premium. Although 
the "new" regression coefficients are of the expected signs, the variable 
that relates to the number of revolutions and coups per year is 
insignificant. The problem arises from the fact that reliable data that 
would measure socio-political conditions across a wide number of 
countries are not available.13 
 
The independent variables in Equation 6 explain a fairly high proportion 
of the variation in growth rates across countries. All variables have the 
expected signs, and all but two are significantly different from zero at 
the usual 5 percent level. When allowance is made for other factors, 
strong convergence persists. As the estimated coefficient shows, the 
gap towards the target value of per capita income is closed at 
approximately 1.8 percent per year. 
 
Since parameter estimates reflect intercountry averages, and do not 
apply to a single country, cross-country regressions of this type may 
only be viewed as establishing certain patterns of correlations. Levine 
                                                          
12 Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), stimulated by the observation that growth 
experience of Latin American countries has been different from rest of the 
countries, since dummy for this region is significantly negative in cross-sectional 
empirical studies (Barro, 1991), found that including various proxies for financial 
repression substantially reduces the significance of the Latin American dummy. 
13 In that respect the index of social capabilities that has heen compiled by 
Pourgerami and Assane (1992) and is defined as a combined score of a cross 
country classification of democracy, civil liberties, and human rights is an important 
improvement. However, it is available only for a small number of countries, and 
hence it was not used here. 
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and Renelt (1991, 1992) and Levine and Zervos (1993) have found, for 
instance, that many of the findings of cross-country regressions are 
fragile to only small changes in the conditioning information set, 
meaning that even minor changes of explanatory variables change the 
sign and/or substantially reduce the significance level of certain 
regression coefficients leading to the considerably different conclusions 
regarding the dependence between the long-run growth and a specific 
macroeconomic policy.14 
 
When interpreting the results of cross-country regressions some other 
limitations should be kept in mind. Economists today have the 
opportunity to use improved cross-country data sets, but the entries 
across a wide variety of countries are still measured inaccurately and 
inconsistently. The problem of interpreting causal linkages is also highly 
present in this type of analysis. In addition, econometrics has not yet 
found a clear answer to the question of whether vastly different 
countries should or should not be put into the same regression (Levine 
and Renelt, 1991). Therefore, Levine and Zervos (1993) strongly argue 
that the regression coefficients in this case should not be interpreted as 
elasticities that imply a magnitude by which the growth rate will change 
in response to a one-percentage change in the specific policy indicator. 
In addition, the relationship between, for example, exports and growth 
should be viewed more as a relationship between trade and growth, 
since using any other relevant proxy for trade intensity would imply the 
same conclusions in respect to the trade-growth relationship. 
 
Although the results of cross-country regressions should in many 
aspects be taken with caution, they remain very useful and insightful. 
After all, by implementing a rather simple methodology, one is able to 
demonstrate whether certain policy-growth relationships do or do not 
hold well across a large number of countries. 
                                                          
14 Levine and Renelt (1992) have found the relationship between the share of 
investment in GDP and growth to be robust, while Levine and Zervos (1993) 
extended this list by the indicators of financial sector development and black-
market exchange rate premium. 
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4. THE GROWTH POTENTIAL: CASE OF CROATIA 
 
The practical relevance of the growth framework introduced in the 
previous section may now be demonstrated by its application to the 
specific case of Croatian economy. The reason why such a procedure is 
being used to discuss the long-run growth potential of the Croatian 
economy is twofold. Although the available data would allow, at least to 
a certain extent, for some other methodological approaches, it seems 
unreasonable to draw future-oriented conclusions from the past in 
which Croatia was, on one hand, a part of another country, and on the 
other, characterized by a significantly different socio-political system 
than the one that is currently being established. Therefore, it seems 
more credible to speculate on the possible growth scenarios and, in 
particular, on policies that are relatively more favorable for economic 
growth given the experience of a wide range of different countries 
comprised in the results of cross-country regression analysis. 
 
The implications of one-equation growth framework leave almost no 
room for optimism in respect to the time needed for full convergence 
between industrialized and less developed economies. Barro's type of 
regressions, reviewed in the previous section, almost unanimously 
imply, for different regions of a country, different countries or groups of 
countries, gap closing at approximately 2 percent per year.15 These 
results were reinforced in our empirical exercise where the preferred 
Equation 6 implies convergence coefficient of 1.8 percent. If all other 
conditions remained unchanged, this rate suggests that the 
convergence would occur, but in a very slow manner with 50 percent of 
the gap being closed in 39 years, 75 percent in 78, and 90 percent in as 
long as 129 years. 
 
However, this type of reasoning does not leave any room for special 
factors. It excludes the possibility that there are countries that enjoy 
some specific favorable conditions which, through beneficial effects on 
                                                          
15 An overview is given in Barro (1992a). 
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the long-run growth might help improve performance beyond that 
suggested by the convergence coefficient in the cross-country 
regressions. Some authors argue that such advantageous conditions 
are primarily applicable to the group of former socialist countries in 
transition. The geographic proximity of these countries to the most 
advanced industrial countries must have favorable effects for trade, and 
for the transfer of skills and technology. In addition, relatively high 
human capital stock, low population growth and shift to the market 
economy should in these economies allow for additional improvements 
in productivity (Dornbusch and Wolf, 1992). 
 
Croatia shares with economies in transition these favorable conditions 
that improve her position. Furthermore, the policy makers themselves 
have the tools to define the long-run productivity target and to enhance 
growth performance beyond what is suggested by the convergence 
coefficient alone. Nevertheless, the process of closing the gap will take 
time, and it is unlikely that the Croatian economy can reach full 
convergence to the productivity level of industrial countries in a 
relatively short period of time. Quick convergence is inconsistent with 
the experience of the most successful countries in the postWorld-War-II 
period.16 
 
In order to answer the question of how rapidly the Croatian economy 
can grow in the future one is confronted with two basic answers. The 
first one suggests that each economy is in an identical catch-up 
situation and hence will follow the rule of closing the gap with the more 
advanced economies at the rate of approximately 2 percent per year. 
 
The second answer is that the Eastern European transition economies 
in general and Croatia in particular are characterized by a number of 
                                                          
16 Postwar Germany, Japan, and more recently Hong-Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan have experienced rapid growth episodes. With very high 
investment rates even these high-growth performers eliminated in the 1960-88 
period only 20 to 50 percentage points of the gap between their productivity levels 
and the productivity level of the U. S. (Summers-Heston, 1991). 
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special advantages and country-specific growth reserves that may be 
unlocked through proper government policy. Those advantages include 
the already existing high levels of education, low population growth, 
and geographic proximity to those advanced industrial countries that 
may facilitate the transfer of skills and technology. In addition, there 
are the beneficial effects for increased productivity that come from 
newly established market incentives. Growth reserves include the long-
term openness of the Croatian economy to Western influences resulting 
in the well-established trade relations with the industrialized countries 
and the war-ravaged capital stock which allows for higher returns to 
the capital input than might be otherwise expected. Yet within this 
approach doubt remains about what specific policy actions would be 
most favorable for enhancing growth performance if political stability 
removes the risk factor. 
 
This problem may be approached by keeping in mind the current 
economic conditions in Croatia, conditions that serve as background for 
the evaluation of the growth opportunities. The Croatian economy 
achieved macroeconomic stabilization in 1994,17 and some of the main 
economic indicators for that year may be used as an appropriate 
starting point in an attempt to quantify future growth prospects. The 
following procedure makes use of the econometric results on the 
determinants of growth rates presented in Section 3. It should, 
however, be noted that this procedure does not allow for all the special 
advantages and country-specific growth reserves to be comprehensively 
included in simulation experiments. The basic strategy is to apply the 
regression parameters of the preferred Equation 6 in order to 
conjecture on the future growth prospects under alternative 
assumptions about required policy initiatives. 
 
Table 3 contains average values for each of the growth determinants 
considered in the sixth equation of Section 3 for the full set of 119 
countries as well as for the specific subsamples of countries. In addition 
                                                          
17 See for details Anušić et al. (1995). 
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to the full sample, average representative countries are defined for the 
fast growing economies, whose average growth rate exceeded 2.5 
percent in the period 1960-88; slow growing economies, whose 
average growth rate fell below 2.5 percent; DECD economies; EU 
economies; and the fastest growing economies of four East Asian 
"tigers"- Hong-Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
Baseline values refer to the corresponding policy indicators for the 
Croatian economy. The following assumptions are made for all three 
simulation experiments: 
• Expressed through the real per capita GDP, the initial current 
ratio of productivity between the Croatian economy and the 
economies of industrialized countries is set at 30 percent (0.3 of 
the average for DECD countries).18 
• Peace shall be sustained in the long-run. 
• A market-oriented economy with the full set of market 
incentives will be put in place. 
• Stable macroeconomic policies implying the absence of both 
price instability and the black market exchange premium will be 
maintained. 
• There is no change in human capital stock, since it is already 
high and requires long time to be significantly changed 
(average number of years of total schooling of the Croatian 
population in the 1990s is set to 8.85 years). 
 
                                                          




The baseline values additionally include government share of 25 
percent and investment ratio of 15 percent (6 percent for equipment 
investment and the remaining 9 for the nonequipment investment).19 
 
As opposed to the baseline experiment that yields the long-run average 
growth rate of approximately 2 percent, indicators of government 
consumption and investment activity are significantly improved in the 
"moderate" simulation and imply an average growth rate of per capita 
output of about 5 percent. Even more improvement with government 
consumption in GDP decreasing to 10 percent and a simultaneous 
increase of investment activity to 35 percent generates a GDP per 
capita growth rate of about 6 percent in the third or "preferred" 
experiment. This scenario corresponds to the growth path of the fastest 
growing countries in the last several decades. One should keep in mind 
that the long-run average growth rate implied within this framework 
means higher initial rates that decrease as time passes and as the 
productivity level comes closer to that for the advanced economies. 
 
Nevertheless, even with such enhanced explanatory variables, it will 
take about 20 years for Croatia to reach the current values of per capita 
output in DECD countries. Since these countries are expected e to grow 
at approximately 2 to 3 percent per year, it will take much more time 
for Croatia to come close to full convergence with them. Whether it is 
possible to sustain the very high investment rates implied by the 
preferred third experiment year after year depends however on 
incentives for private and public investment and most of all on the 
availability of domestic and foreign resources. 
 
                                                          
19 Authors's calculations for the current level of human capital stock are based on 
"Popis stanovništva 1991" (1994). Baseline values for the other policy indicators are 
derived from SYC, Mjesečno statističko izvješće, Gospodarska kretanja u Hrvatskoj, 
and Miljenović (1995). See Mervar (1996) for details. 
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The conclusion seems to be quite clear. As expected, there is no simple 
way to boost Croatia's economic growth. However, in the years ahead 
the prospects for growth seem strong. Formulation of wellbalanced 
policy packages that can actually achieve such growth performance is, 
of course, much more complex. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
There is general agreement that policy makers should pay more 
attention to long-run growth and that there are some general principles 
that work to improve the process of continued economic growth. Broad 
empirical evidence suggests that beneficial effects for long-run growth 
would emerge from stable macroeconomic policies within a market-
oriented structure, from high saving and investment, from a well 
educated work force, from improved economic openness, from a low 
burden of government, and from low population growth within a stable 
socio-political environment. Still each individual country is left to 
manage the art of applying these general principles to specific policies. 
 
There is a broad agreement among economists that macroeconomic 
stabilization is a necessary precondition for economic growth 
(Dornbusch, 1991; Roe, 1992; Allen, 1992; Frenkel, 1992). However, 
because of political pressures to deliver results on growth performance 
in the short-term, policy makers in many countries have been 
repeatedly forced to move to the growth stage before the stabilization 
phase was finished thereby endangering the whole process (Frenkel, 
1992). 
 
The empirical tests based on the growth experiences across a variety of 
countries suggest that policy makers in Croatia should continue 
pursuing stable macroeconomic policies in the future in order to build 
confident environment with minimum risk for sudden policy changes or 
reversals. That prospect primarily refers to the price stability which 
appears to be the aggregate indicator of whether such a goal has been 
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accomplished. Although the principal factors of growth are investment 
rates, human capital stocks, openness of the economy, and many other 
factors, failure to achieve price stability increases uncertainty, destroys 
optimal decision-making, thwarts optimal resource allocation, and 
jeopardizes economic growth. Therefore, the role of monetary policy in 
creating the proper economic environment for growth is to ensure price 
stability in the long-run. Such a policy minimizes the risk of sudden 
policy changes and contributes to the credibility of the overall economic 
policy (Duisenberg, 1992; De Long and Summers, 1992; and Shigehara, 
1992). 
 
Attention should also be given to establishing and continually improving 
general conditions of a fully market-strategy. The proper blend of state 
and market in the economy is a decisive factor in the sense that 
government actions should be confined only to the establishment of the 
rules of the game as well as to the areas where market fail (Summers 
and Thomas, 1993). Government needs to provide a basic institutional 
infrastructure for the normal functioning of a market economy; that 
infrastructure includes a legal system that is capable of protecting 
property rights, a diversified financial system, and a stable monetary 
and exchange rate regime. Domestic policies should also focus on 
building an environment that offers an adequate reward to foreign 
investors when they bring capital and ideas from the rest of the world 
and put them to use with domestic resources. 
 
Investment in physical and human capital remains, however, the 
driving force of economic growth. Certain part of the already existing 
capital stock in the economies in transition has little value in the market 
economy since the investment decisions in the former system have 
been made upon criteria other than profitability. As shown by 
Borensztein and Montiel (1992), due to the significant returns, 
investment rates of only modest proportions are needed to produce 
rather impressive growth in the former socialist economies. However, 
inefficiencies of the old system are also present in areas other than 
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fixed capital, and there are many other potential gains from market 
incentives. 
 
It is reasonable to expect that in the Croatia's current phase 
characterized by the uncompleted processes of privatization and 
restoration of private property rights within the environment still 
burdened by uncertainty, public investment will be significant. 
Processes of restructuring and rebuilding physical capital stock can 
generate sufficiently high levels of investment demand in Croatia, but 
the problem still exists regarding the feasibility of financing such 
investment needs. Mobilization of public saving seems most important 
in the short-run because other financial sources, such as domestic 
private saving and foreign saving, are unlikely to make decisive 
contributions soon, with the former still being low and the latter 
remaining unavailable due to the potential risks. Sufficient mobilization 
of public resources requires, therefore, an exceptional revenue effort. 
However, building institutional conditions and diversified portfolio 
options to encourage private saving needs to take place immediately. 
Change in attitude towards saving is needed if domestic savings is not 
to become a persistent obstacle for long-run investment. In addition, 
incentives through deregulation, liberalized trade policies, productive 
financial framework and confident environment would allow domestic 
saving to be invested at home and the foreign saving to become 
available (Auerbach, 1992). 
 
Some authors argue that there is no basis for intervention in the form 
of generalized or targeted incentives to actively encourage additional 
investment in capital beyond what would result in competitive markets. 
Other scholars--and the cross-country regressions of Section 3-suggest 
tax credits targeted to investment in general as well as to certain types 
of investment that are especially favorable for enhancing growth such 
as machinery and equipment investment (De Long and Summers, 1992; 
and Feldstein, 1992). Incentives to saving and investment are also 
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likely to have positive effects on technological progress since progress 
is capital-using and partly embodied in fixed capital goods. 
 
When using the average number of years of schooling of total 
population as a proxy, the Barro-Lee data set (1993b) on educational 
attainment indicates that ex-socialist countries have the highest human 
capital stock due to the compulsory primary education. Croatia is no 
exception in that respect due to the eight-year compulsory primary 
education. If compared with the corresponding figures in the Barro-Lee 
data set, the estimates for Croatia are among the highest and above 
the average for the DECD countries. It should, however, be stressed, 
that this proxy does not include any information on the quality of 
education. 
 
Besides promoting formal education, effective support for human 
capital formation should be directed to on-the-job-training. Due to 
externalities and spillover effects, there is general agreement that both 
education and on-job-training should be highly subsidized (Plosser, 
1992). However, more money invested in education does not 
necessarily improve human capital stock. The potential for that 
improvement is often related to the structural reforms in the school 
system that might include the introduction of competition in providing 
education services. Alternative measures within the effective support 
for education include sending students abroad for advanced education 
and giving incentives for individuals with skills and knowledge to 
migrate to the country. In general, attractive wages and good working 
conditions for skilled work continue to be the best incentives for 
acquiring higher education and for preventing the outflow of a highly 
educated work force.20 
 
Empirical evidence verifies that differences in growth performances are 
not a result of a random process. Growth rates are systematically 
correlated with variables that describe the economic and socio-political 
                                                          
20 See Calvo and Frenkel (1992), Barro (1992b), Miller (1992), and Romer (1993). 
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environment. Thus, catching-up must be a very complex process, and 
only countries with appropriate economic and institutional 
characteristics can succeed in accomplishing it (Fagerberg, 1994). 
However, by managing appropriate long-run policies an opportunity to 
substantially reduce the gap with respect to developed countries does 
exist. 
 
There is no doubt that this convergence process takes time and that it 
requires strong and consistent economic policy making. However, there 
is also a sound hope that if the requisite conditions are fulfilled, the 
optimistic scenarios for the future growth prospects of Croatian 




Source and Definition of Cross-Country Statistical Series  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
Growth rate of real GDP per capita, average, 1960-88: Summers and Heston (1991, 
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1960: Barro and Lee (1993b). 
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population, 1960: Barro and Lee (1993b). 
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population, 1960: Barro and Lee (1993b). 
Population growth, average annual rate, 1960-88: Summers and Heston (1991, 
PWT5). 
Ratio of investment to real GDP, average, 1960-88: Summers and Heston (1991, 
PWTS). 
Ratio of equipment investment to real GDP, average, 1960-88: De Long and 
Summers (1993). 
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Summers (1993). 
Ratio of government consumption to real GDP, average, 1960-88: Summers and 
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Inflation rate, average, 1960-89: King and Levine (1993). 
Black market exchange rate premium, average, 1960-88: King and Levine (1993). 
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